Roles & Missions: The Soviet National Air-Defence command (PVO)
had first entered the field of airborne early warning & control
(AEW&C) operations in the mid-60s with the Tu-126 Moss, a conservative
adaptation of the Tu-114 Camel airliner (itself a modification of
the Tu-95 Bear strategic bomber). While adequate for the requirements
of its time (and reportedly quite effective in directing intercepts
of Pakistani aircraft under Indian service in the 1971 war), the
Tu-126 was clearly facing obsolescence in light of the new hardware
and tactics being adopted by the US Strategic Air Command (SAC)
throughout the
seventies. SAC was very clearly beginning to emphasize low-level
penetration tactics with its existing B-52 & FB-111 fleet, and
weapon systems optimised for such an attack profile (the B-1B bomber
and the AGM-86B cruise missile) would soon begin to roll of the
production line, posing a severe problem for the PVO. A thorough
modernisation of PVO equipment & tactics was therefore in need.
Hardware-wise, the upgrade program revolved around the acquisition
& operation of three main systems: The A-50 AEW&C aircraft,
the MiG-31 interceptor and the S-300P (SA-10) SAM system. Of the
three, the A-50 was
arguably the most critical node and the one that presented the greatest
technical challenges.
The A-50 airframe was directly based on a stretched Ilyushin IL-76
transport, an aircraft in widespread service with the Soviet/Russian
military transport aviation (VTA). The first prototype made its
first flight in 1980, but protracted problems with the electronics
suite did not allow operational deliveries to commence until 1984/85.
It was estimated that at least 12 were in service by 1990, with
an annual production rate of five machines per year and about 40
produced by 1992. The original Il-76 airframe was also used by other
air forces as the carrier for their own indigenous AEW platforms.
Iraq had an ambitious AEW&C development program based on the
same aircraft. The first result of its R&D efforts was a standard
Il-76 with a Thomson-CSF Tigre-G radar fitted on the ramp door,
facing aft, and made its debut at 1989. The aircraft did not have
a true fighter-control capability and thus was only an
airborne radar picket, data-linking its information back to ground-based
air-defence HQs. This aircraft was designated Baghdad-1. The second
Iraqi attempt was more fruitful: Adnan-1 was a true
AEW&C platform and
quite similar in appearance to A-50, with a fixed saucer dome housing
two back-to-back radar (Tigre-G again?) antennas. Flight trials
were accelerated by the PGW-II crisis and commenced by mid-December
1990. Three such aircraft were built between 1989 and 1991.
Strengths: There is little doubt that the A-50 represents an enormous
leap in
Soviet/Russian AEW&C capabilities over the Tu-126. Low-level
target
detection (particularly against low-RCS targets such as cruise missiles)
and
ECCM capability is significantly improved, as is the multi-target
tracking ability. The aircraft can reportedly stay aloft without
refuelling for four to six hours and can remain airborne for another
four hours with mid-air refuelling. A maximum range of 1,800 kilometers
has been quoted, while the radar (originally an evolutionary version
of the Tu- 126s Flat Jack system, but subsequently
significantly modernised) is quoted to have a maximum detection
range of up to 600-800 kilometers for high-altitude targets and
200-400km at low altitude fighter-sized targets. An important feature
of the aircraft (and a legacy from the Il-76 airframe) is the ability
to use semi-prepared airstrips in wartime operations. This adds
significantly to the operational deployment flexibility of the aircraft.
Weaknesses: Even in its latest A-50U version, the Mainstay is probably
inferior to its E-3C Sentry sibling, particularly the RSIP-upgraded
version. Maximum detection range is shorter, as is the ECCM and
low-RCS detection capability. This is largely a result of the inferior
state of Russian electronics, although the existing gap has been
significantly narrow ed down in the last decade. The AEW&C systems
multitarget handling ability is also lower (150 targets simultaneously),
partially because there are fewer console operators on
board (This deficiency is not currently modeled in any version of
computer Harpoon.).
Employment & Scenario Use: Contrary to its predecessor (Tu-126)
and particularly to its Western equivalent (E-3), the A-50 has had
a relatively uneventful career so far, in 2 decades of service with
the PVO & VVS. Most of the aircraft were typically based in
Pechora in northern Russia, executing patrols over the entire Arctic
border (in concert with Tu-128s, MiG-31s and Su-27s) and in particular
over the highly valuable Kola Peninsula region. Detachments of 2-4
aircraft were occasionally employed in other regions. For example,
such a detachment was observed operating in the GDR region from
1986/87 onwards, in cooperation with MiG-31 interceptors. Another
detachment operated over the Black Sea in 1991 during operation
Desert Storm, reportedly monitoring the collation air offensive
and in particular the employment of stealth aircraft and cruise
missiles.
It is unclear if the Baghdad-1 aircraft was used operationally by
Iraq or remained a testbed. Of the three Adnan-1 aircraft, one was
destroyed on the ground by Allied air attacks and the other two
fled to Iran, together with the majority of the Iraqi air force.
In 1994 NATO proposed modifying the operational A-50 aircraft with
NATO-compatible communications & IFF equipment, in order to
enable
Russia to provide AEW&C support to future United Nations or
coalition
operations. The Russian response has not been clarified.
In early April 2000, the Russian government reached a preliminary
agreement to lease two A-50 aircraft to the Indian Air Force, to
step up its aerial surveillance on the border with Pakistan. India
conducted trials of the A-50 in July 2000, and the results were
reportedly as satisfactory. In February 2004 India and
Israel signed an agreement for IAI to fit three Il-76 aircarft with
the Phalcon system. This deal still needs to be aproved by the United
States and a similar previous proposal was rejected. In September
2000 it was reported that Rosvoorouzhenie, Russias arms-exporting
company, had entered negotiations with China to lease a pair of
A-50 aircraft, as a replacement for the Israeli Phalcon. Eventually
however the deal was dropped.
Equipment: A-50 Mainstay-A (1984) - DB2000 v6.4.1
Radar
Name
Max Range
Abilities
Notes
Shmel
250nm
Surface Search, Air Search, Range Information,
Bearing
Information, Altitude Information, IFF Information
Electronic Warfare
Name
Max Range
Abilities
Notes
ESM
600nm
Surface Search, Air Search, Range Information
Bearing Information, Classification
Passive
RWR/ESM/ELINT
Versions (H3-DB2000)
A-50 Mainstay-A (1984): As described
A-50 Mainstay-B (1989): New Schmel-2 radar (300nm max)
Current Service
All available A-50s are currently operating from Ivanov airbase,
west of Moscow. Given the current air operations in Iraq, it is
not unlikely that a detachment may be operating in the southern
Russian regions to monitor UK/US air activity.