Hi guys here a great AAR for the Scenario from the Colonial Wars Database written by Chris Comars
Invasion AAR
Disclaimer
What follows is fiction although the scenario played out as narrated. Any resemblance to persons or events outside of the Harpoon universe is purely coincidental. Letter groups, except for the fictional author of this piece, have replaced all character names. Should there be any real person named Norbert Ling-Cod; you have both my sympathy and a sincere apology. This concludes my series of After Action Reports prepared for Sirius’s CWDB Indonesian Conflict battleset. It was played out in H3 v3.6.3 and all times given are calculated local times. I’m not going to apologize for the length of the piece; it’s purportedly extracted from a book after all.
Thanks for the campaign Paul.
This after action report has been condensed from Missiles over Paradise, The Causes, Conduct and Consequences of the Indonesian War, 1966: copyright Norbert Ling-Cod, Phonetically Challenged Press 1972.
CHAPTER 8 – Operation Raffles
By late afternoon on June 25th, the Far Eastern Fleet Headquarters operations staff under Commander JT had completed the details for OPERATION RAFFLES and submitted the final plan to Admiral KD’s staff at the UK and ANZAC Force HQ bunker. Initial naval forces can be found in Table 8-1. Victorious Group (VAdm SL in HMS Victorious), Melbourne Group (RAdm PN, RAN in HMAS Melbourne) and the Amphibious Group (RAdm DB on board HMS Bulwark) would remain concentrated with VAdm SL in tactical command.
In essence, the principal fighting power of the combined Anglo-Australian/New Zealand fleet was concentrated in the two light fleet carriers but both air groups lacked a strong strike force and had little more than an absolute minimum of aircraft needed for fleet defence. In addition HMAS Melbourne, although well equipped for anti-submarine duties, had only a handful of inferior Seahawk fighters to perform both ground attack and combat air patrol missions. HMS Victorious had state of the art Sea Vixen fighters and Buccaneer bombers but she lacked radar guided air-to-air missiles and was also short of American made Bullpup ground-attack missiles that would allow the Buccaneers to attack from outside the range of Indonesian anti-aircraft batteries.
Transiting north through the Eastern Indian Ocean from where she had been receiving emergency battle damage repairs at Perth was Adm KD’s trump card, HMS Eagle and her escorts under the command of VAdm MC. HMS Eagle’s air group included several Scimitar fighter-bombers and was both more experienced and stronger in numbers of first line combat aircraft than the other two light fleet carriers put together. However, she too was short of guided missiles and still had shipwrights on board trying to complete action repairs. Specific details of the initial naval air strength can be found in Table 8-2.
Concentrated at airfields in Malaysia and Brunei was the cream of the RAF, RNZAF and RAAF ground attack air forces. In addition, RAF Strike Command had sent a significant force of Vulcan bombers under Air Vice Marshal FN, who commanded all RAF land-based aircraft and retained operational control of the committed RAAF and RNZAF elements. Initial disposition of UK and ANZAC air units is found in Table 8-3 and refer to the map, facing page 427, for the locations of all UK and ANZAC forces at 1100 local time on 27th June. AVM FN was known to be dismissive of the Naval Forces and on the night of the 26th had a very public row with Adm KD in the headquarters operations room where he let it be known that as far as he was concerned, the Navy could stay in Singapore Roads while the RAF and the paratroopers won the war alone. The after effects of this squalid little affair would return to haunt the Royal Air Force as the action unfolded.
We saw in Chapter 7 how the Indonesian’s planned to meet the invasion that they knew was inevitable. Hopes that the Soviet Union would broker a cease fire were in vein and any illusions that the presence of the Soviet Indian Ocean flotilla visiting Jakarta might prevent the Anglo-ANZAC offensive were dashed when the Kynda Class guided missile cruiser Admiral Fokin and her escorts sailed before dawn on the 26thJune and shaped a course back to the Indian Ocean. As far as can be determined Soviet RAdm ZR never visited any high-ranking members of the Indonesian government or military although he did spend almost all of the 25th June at the Soviet embassy for consultations. A report by British intelligence that he, or members of his staff, spent the 26th at the Indonesian Ministry of Defence was in error but was to have tragic consequences in a few days.
The signal to execute Operation Raffles was received on HMS Victorious at 1100 on the 27th. In essence, the plan was the amphibious group and the two CVBG’s were to transit the Karimata Straight separating the South China Sea from the Java Sea. The strike carriers were then to station themselves about 100 nm northeast of Jakarta while the amphibious ships made the run into the coast under an air umbrella provided by Victorious and Melbourne. Simultaneously, land based air strikes would eliminate the Indonesian airfields at Pekanbaru, Kalijati, Pontianak and Jakarta by sequential attacks aimed at the Indonesian Air Force infrastructure and military installations around the planned landing areas. Once the landing ships were in position, the fleet would provide close air support for the marines and paratroops landed by ship, helicopter and parachute. Eagle would be within range for this final phase and lend her experienced air group to support the landings. The choice of transiting the eastern Karimata Straight was controversial with Eastern Fleet staff. Although wider than the western Bangka Straight, it was also somewhat deeper and offered hiding places for the small force of Indonesian submarines. Commander JT favoured the Bangka Straight even though intelligence had identified radar and shore batteries in place there. His argument was that forcing the Bangka facilitated arriving off Jakarta in darkness whereas the Karimata Straight meant the amphibious forces would arrive in daylight or have to wait in the South China Sea where detection by Indonesian forces was almost inevitable. Adm KD decided to ignore and bypass the Indonesian forces on the Bangka and committed considerable air assets to sanitizing the Karimata Straight for submarines.
The RAAF and elements of the RNZAF based at Butterworth on the Isthmus of Kra were well equipped with Canberra bombers and Mirage IIIAE’s, they would draw first blood. Their target was the Indonesian airfield at Pekanbaru and shortly before 1300 hours, Australian Mirages fitted with the French made R-530 air-to-air missiles arrived to create air superiority over the air base. The Australian pilots quickly established dominance shooting down three MiG-17 and two MiG-15 fighters that rose to contest the skies over their field. Shortly before the bombers started their runs, another MiG-17 was shot down but now all the R-530 missiles were gone as more MiG’s were sortied. The first wave of ground attack Mirages struck air defence batteries with their AS.30 missiles to some effect and returned to Butterworth without losses but the follow-on Canberra’s lost five planes shot down, four RAAF and one RNZAF, destroyed by the surviving heavy flak and a Mirage was lost in a gunfight with a MiG-17 after its R-530’s had been expended. Targeting was effective however and in spite of the losses, Pekanbaru was badly damaged and although it was not known at the time, no further effective sorties would be launched from there. The heavy losses to the few available Canberra’s shook up Air Commodore VH, RAAF, commanding the Australian squadrons at Butterworth who decided that further attacks against well defended targets would be conducted only with AS.30’s and Bullpups, since these allowed an effective attack from outside the range of the Indonesian’s favourite anti-aircraft gun, the radar aimed 57mm automatic cannon. To end the story on Pekanbaru air force base, the Australian ground attack Mirages would return later that evening and finish destroying the base facilities without loss to themselves. Meanwhile the RAF Hunters at RAF Kuching near Brunei struck Pontianak air force base, doing some damage without loss. Without informing Adm KD, AVM FN had decided that the Canberra’s and Vulcan’s based around Singapore would wait until after dark to hit the selected targets around Jakarta but did allow sorties of Shackelton ASW aircraft to conduct operations in the Karimata Straight and two Canberra PR.9 sorties for detailed reconnaissance of both marine choke points and the Jakarta area. One of the latter was shot down by a MiG-21 near Kalijati air force base but valuable intelligence was obtained on these missions. Another Shackelton located a group of KOMAR class missile boats and a surfaced Indonesian submarine heading into the path of the on-coming carrier battle groups (see Map 8-C). The sub, now known to be KRI Alugoro (Lt Comd PGH), was caught and sunk by an RAN Gannett, a first for Australia’s Fleet Air Arm. The Shackelton, piloted by Squadron Leader CM, attacked the missile boats with rockets and bombs, sinking one and an RAAF Neptune from Butterworth and commanded by Flight Lieutenant BV joining the ASW operations in the Straight, sank another.
Initially, the advance of the naval forces went well. HMAS Melbourne was the dedicated ASW carrier while Victorious provided CAP and AEW. Land based ASW aircraft and RAN Gannett’s dominated the Karimata Straight and soon a pair of Wessex ASW helicopters equipped with sophisticated dipping sonar were also actively hunting for submarines in the 69 mile wide waterway. By mid-afternoon, an attack developed from Pontianak on Melbourne that was intercepted by a pair of Seahawks. A force of WW2 era B-25 Mitchell bombers escorted by four P-51 Mustang fighters came in at medium altitude from due east. The interception was made at 45 nm and the Seahawks destroyed three Mitchell’s and two Mustangs but both were lost in the process. Melbourne’s last two Seahawks and a pair of Sea Vixens from Victorious splashed the remaining Indonesian strike aircraft and escorts but with two Seahawks under repair and another two lost in action, Melbourne’s ability to defend herself was greatly reduced. A Wessex was detached from the ASW screen and rescued both Australian pilots and two Indonesian aircrew. This represented the sole offensive effort from Pontianak; there was no significant activity at the base after the first Hunter strike from RAF Kuching.
In the late afternoon a force of TU-16 Badger bombers took off from Adisumaro air force base on Java and attacked the Dutch surface force that had already entered the Java Sea. Two Sea Vixens from Victorious were sent to intercept but before they could arrive, the bombers launched a salvo of long-range anti-ship missiles at the Dutch squadron. The guided missile cruiser HNMS De Zeven Provincien fired volley after volley of American made Terrier SAM’s shooting down all the Soviet made missiles while the Sea Vixens destroyed the four TU-16’s. The Dutch Commander, VAdm GvK radioed congratulations and thanks to the UK and ANZAC forces and continued on with his mission that was detailed in Chapter 7.
By dusk on the 27th of June VAdm SL had every reason to be confident that the plan was working. The Karimata Straight had, to all appearances, been cleared of Indonesian forces and the onset of night would place the day oriented Indonesian air force at a disadvantage compared with his all weather carrier planes. Intense anti submarine operations in the Straight had yielded no new contacts after the surfaced W-Class boat had been sunk but additional sonar fitted Wessex helicopters were flown off to support the transit. Suddenly, at 2318 hours, disaster struck when in quick succession HMNZS Waikato detected torpedoes on her sonar and then HMAS Sidney (Captain BLR, RAN) suddenly blew up and sank within minutes. Now it is known that there was only one torpedo and that induced secondary explosions caused the terribly rapid loss of the ship and 1235 of her crew and embarked soldiers. At the time however, the series of blinding detonations appeared to come from an entire salvo of torpedoes and perhaps multiple submarines or even mines. The Amphibious Group was in the process of executing a radical turn to starboard in response to Waikato’s torpedo warning and the disaster unfolding on Sidney caused enormous confusion in the remainder of the formation. Waikato and HMS Lowestoft were detached and assisted by a Shackelton, Gannett’s from Melbourne and ASW helicopters, they destroyed the W-Class KRI Nanggala (Lt DSH commanding) with the loss of all hands. Lt DSH’s ambush was superbly executed, he allowed the attack carriers to exit the Karimata Straight and then cut out an irreplaceable assault ship with a well-placed shot. He then evaded numerous attacks from surface ships and aircraft for over an hour before a salvo of depth charges from Lowestoft found his boat. Only after it was confirmed that the attacking submarine has been destroyed was HMAS Supply detached from the Melbourne Group to conduct rescue operations and it was almost three hours after the sinking that she arrived on the scene. See Appendix G for details on the report of the Australian Parliamentary Commission concerning the catastrophic loss of HMAS Sidney.
While disaster was unfolding in the Karimata Straight, the strikes planned by RAF Strike Command were concluding. Map 8D shows details of the targets while strike compositions and aircraft loadouts are found in Table 8-5. Coordination was good and the attacks were effective initially. The Canberra’s came in low and but the Vulcan’s bombed from high altitude and the strikes were covered by RAAF Mirages from Butterworth operating at the limits of their range. In the darkness, the all-weather Australian jets shot down all of the MiG-21’s that sortied out of Kalijati air base without loss to them. Kalijati was hit hard and would see no further Indonesian air activity. Only one Canberra was lost to ground fire just outside Jakarta, they were effective and destroyed or badly damaged all of their primary targets with Bullpup missiles and gravity bombs. The Strike Command Vulcan’s however were entirely ineffective. Having attacked several army installations and units from 8000 metres they then flew north out over the Java Sea and loitered while a PR.9 used infrared cameras to determine suitable targets of opportunity. It was quickly determined that none of the primary targets were significantly damaged and they would have to go in again. The strike leader opted for a low level attack even though all of the Canberra’s and Mirages were returning to base and they were totally on their own against an alerted defence. Of the six Vulcan bombers on the raid, four would be lost to ground fire and two of them would be shot down before they attacked their targets. The failure of Strike Command required another major ground strike at Jakarta, there were too many surviving Indonesian defences for the slim strike assets of the carriers to handle alone. Worse, all of the highly trained Vulcan aircrews were lost without damaging the enemy.
The strike aircraft on board Victorious and Melbourne were not idle during this period however. Throughout the night the duty AEW Gannet had identified several groups of Indonesian warships including more missile boats in the Bangka Straight and vectored small strike elements to the attack. These occurred throughout the night and by first light, the Indonesian Navy had been swept from the Java Sea. All were anxious to extract a measure of revenge for the loss of Sidney.
Meanwhile Eagle and her escorts were sailing north towards Java with an AEW Gannet 80-miles ahead of the battle group and a pair of Sea Vixen’s spotted on deck for immediate launch. VAdm MC was increasingly nervous of a group of ships off to the east that were emitting the signatures of Soviet radars. He believed them to be the Soviet Indian Ocean squadron and so not a proximate threat, but one that deserved watching closely all the same. With the loss of HMAS Sidney and the subsequent destruction of her attacker VAdm MC was told by his staff Intelligence Officer, Commander HC, that that should be an end of the Indonesian Navy’s submarine force and that if the reports of the RAF were accurate, then threats to the Eagle Group had become essentially one-dimensional. Within minutes of this conversation, conducted on Eagle’s darkened Flag Bridge, HMS Lincoln acting as plane guard to the east of the carrier, detected a hard submerged contact and raced to engage. The formation turned to 260 degrees and called for maximum speed while Lincoln and the ASW helicopter on station were sent to prosecute the contact. For the next twenty minutes, the frigate and a pair of Wessex helicopters tightened the net on the submerged contact that was originally thought to be biological but then was detected manoeuvring at speed. A number of air-dropped torpedoes were launched and Lincoln fired salvos from her Squid ASW mortar at various times. Eventually, an undersea explosion was detected and the contact faded. Lincoln continued to detect two torpedoes on her sonar but identified them as helicopter dropped Mk44’s and so not a hazard, even as she turned to regain her station in the Eagle Group. Unfortunately Lincoln’s torpedo identification was off this night, one was a Soviet made heavy-weight anti-ship torpedo fired by KRI Trisula (Lt Comd PKN) who’s Parthian shot blew the stern off Lincoln killing nine sailors. RFA Reliant picked all of the Lincoln survivors up but VAdm MC’s confidence in his intelligence officer was badly shaken. Lincoln finally sank about 0215 hours.
As morning approached, an RAAF Neptune no longer required to patrol the Karimata Straight for submarines was conducting a radar sweep of the north coast of the island of Java. VAdm MC requested that it reconnoitre the surface group east of his force and determine that it was in fact, the Soviet IO Squadron. This took some time but by 0530 the Neptune was closing to visual range, first identifying the Indonesian Kronstadt Class frigate KRI Momare astern of the Soviet cruiser/destroyer force. Having several 5.5 inch Zuni rockets remaining the Neptune pilot Flt Lt RBC, RAAF traded a rocket salvo for a burst of cannon fire from Momare but both sides missed. The Neptune then closed with the Soviet’s to take some low-light photographs when it came under fire from a Kanin Class destroyer now known to be BPK Derzky. Flt Lt RBC quickly dove to the deck and flew out of range while radioing Eagle for help. This minor action precipitated a crisis that would bring the world to the brink of nuclear war and the repercussions of which, continue to affect international relations even as of this writing.
On board Eagle, VAdm MC was shocked to learn that the Soviets had fired on the Neptune. He quickly went with his staff to the Flag Plot, next to the Operations Room to decide what reaction to take to this provocation. The Soviets were only 106 nautical miles away and the Eagle group were well within range of the anti-ship missiles on the force flagship KR Admiral Fokin. Discussion turned to the threat and how to counter it but in the short term, the two ready Sea Vixen’s were launched and directed east by HMS Hampshire where they might be able to shoot down some incoming SS-N-2 missiles before Hampshire’s Sea Slug SAM system could be brought to bear. Key factors now became: Did the Soviets have a targeting solution on the Eagle Group? Would the Soviets escalate and launch an attack on Eagle? Could the Eagle Group defend against a full salvo of SS-N-2 anti-ship missile? Could Eagle attack the Soviet force in keeping with paragraph 4 of the initial orders from London?
The latter factor seemed to authorize a counter attack but none of the staff were in agreement of what constituted “neutralizing” the Soviet threat under these circumstances. The decision was made to wait until daylight; the attack on the Neptune may just have been one ship captain’s response to the rocket attack on the Indonesian frigate that they had just witnessed. It was thought that once the Soviets had positive identification of their shadower, then there would be no further aggression. In the meantime however, the aircrews of the Bullpup armed Buccaneer’s and Scimitar’s that had been readied for the anticipated morning ground attack missions now received preliminary briefings for an anti-shipping strike. Hundreds of miles away in Singapore Adm KD sent a terse message to VAdm MC essentially deferring to the man on the spot but emphasizing the importance of Eagle’s strike capacity now that Strike Command’s Vulcan force had been decimated in the overnight attacks. Also the tragic loss of Sidney and the soldiers she carried would make the ground forces job that much more difficult and Eagle’s air group might mean the difference between victory and defeat. So far the cost of OPERATION RAFFLES had been huge and the spectre of Soviet intervention introduced the possibility that all might be for naught. Direct voice communications were difficult and the high-frequency (HF) radio link to Singapore used enciphered Morse code because the voice channels were unusable due to atmospheric conditions. With little enlightenment or guidance from Fleet, VAdm MC struggled with the decision on whether to launch on the Soviet force or not.
At around 0700 in conditions of full daylight, Flt Lt RBC cautiously brought his Neptune above the visual horizon and commenced to close the Soviet squadron with all navigation lights on and identifying his plane on international HF and VHF emergency radio frequencies. Closing to about 8-miles he identified a Kynda Class cruiser, four destroyers and an oiler. It is now known the only three destroyers were present and nearby KRI Momare was mistaken for part of the Red Fleet flotilla. At seven-miles Flt Lt RBC was horrified to see the centre ship launch first one and then a second missile in his direction. Diving to sea level he dodged both and ran back north barely above the wave tops, handling his big submarine hunter like a fighter-bomber. It looked like the Soviets were full of fight and this information determined the course of action that was to follow. Obviously hostile now, LCdr SNC, Flag Operations Officer and Cdr JCL Eagle’s Commander (Air), were for launching an immediate airstrike on the Soviets. LCdr SNC pointed to the intelligence report received the day before placing the Soviet force commander at the Indonesian Defence Ministry on the 26th of June. It was therefore evident that this attack was pre-planned and perhaps was meant to be in concert with the submarine attack earlier that morning. Cdr HC disagreed and pointed to the fact that the Soviets had left Jakarta on the 26th so the entire episode was suspect. His advice was to withdraw to the west and contact Whitehall before shooting at a Soviet naval force in international waters and in time of peace. By now though VAdm MC was wedded to the idea of removing the Soviet threat by striking first. He doubted the ability of his limited CAP and Hampshire’s Sea Slugs to stop an SSM attack and refused to contact Whitehall directly since he was covered by his orders and the politicians had “obviously approved of them”. Also Cdr HC’s credibility as an intelligence officer has been lost with the sinking of HMS Lincoln. Even though Eagle’s own captain counselled waiting and requesting further instructions, the Admiral asked Cdr JCL to personally lead the airstrike. He was clearly heard to say to Commander (Air) “Bloody their noses, John. Then the bastards will leave us alone.”
Three Buccaneer’s and two Scimitar’s each armed with four Bullpup air-to-surface missiles sank the entire Soviet force without loss. Ironically KRI Momare was left untouched and indeed, the Eagle’s strike force never even attacked her. Her crew witnessed the entire attack and one of her officers took the grainy photographs of the action that would soon be on the front pages of practically every newspaper on earth and between pages 427 and 428 of this volume. The details of the attack from a Soviet perspective and the subsequent political and military fallout from the Eagle Group air strike will be covered in detail in Chapter 9. Within an hour of the last Scimitar trapping onto Eagle’s flight deck, an all stations alert to UK forces everywhere to cease military operations against Indonesia immediately. Mere hours before the invasion of Jakarta was to take place, the forces were recalled and OPERATION RAFFLES was cancelled. The transports carrying the paratroopers were already in the air heading for Java were recalled and the final round of air strikes were minutes from launching but were stood down and briefed on the new threat. However, in the Big Picture, the Soviet Union was threatening a full-scale nuclear attack on the UK, America had gone to DEFCON 2 and both the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces in Europe were on war alert. Suddenly, the scrap in the Far East seemed pretty insignificant.
Author’s note:
There you go, I gave it up and dragged you all the way here to chronicle a loss. Having destroyed the Soviet force it then occurred that now the Bear might be a little bit angry. What would America do? In 1966 America’s war in Viet Nam was just ramping up. Would defeating the Indonesian communists be worth a global conflict, probably including nuclear weapons and triggered by a member of NATO? What would NATO as a whole do? Could there be a diplomatic solution to such a crisis? How would the West react if the Soviets annihilated a NATO naval force on the high seas and without a declaration of hostilities? In retrospect the only threat to Eagle was the Kynda, I probably should have surgically removed her and carried on with the mission. In 1966, Bullpup missiles were good for that just as Harpoon is good for letting ones imagination run riot.
Ubique
Chris
